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DEATH BY JUDICIAL OVERKILL: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OVERRIDING
JURY RECOMMENDATIONS AGAINST THE
DEATH PENALTY
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 30, 1978, a Florida jury convicted Raleigh Por-
ter on two counts of premeditated murder.1 After a sentencing
hearing the jury recommended that Porter be imprisoned for life
rather than face the death penalty. 2 The trial judge, however,
overrode the jury decision and sentenced Porter to death 3 pursu-
ant to Florida's death penalty statute.4 On March 28, 1995, one
day before the execution date, Porter's attorney received a tele-
phone call from a court clerk claiming that he had some informa-
tion regarding the case.5 The clerk said that while Porter's trial
was pending, the judge stopped by the clerk's office to have coffee
and talk.6 The judge said that he had changed the venue in Por-
ter's case to another county that "'had good, fair minded people..
. who would listen and consider the evidence and then convict the
son-of-a-bitch."' 7 The judge then vowed to "'send Porter to the
chair."' 8 Based on these revelations, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the judge had a fixed predisposition to sen-
tence Porter to death and stayed Porter's execution so that an evi-
dentiary hearing could be conducted on the matter.9
Although disturbing, such a scenario comes as no surprise
when legislatures grant judges the authority to flout a cornerstone
of our legal system: jury verdicts. However, what is surprising is
1. See Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 931 (11th Cir. 1986).
2. See id.
3. See id at 931-32.
4. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1996).
5. See Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1995).
6. See id.
7 Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 1489.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
that something so facially unconstitutional as jury override capital
statutes could be enacted despite our Constitution's express guar-
antees of certain unalienable rights, such as the right against the
deprivation of life without due process of law.10
Jury override is a sentencing procedure that allows judges to
impose the death penalty over jury recommendations of life im-
prisonment without parole.' It essentially creates a judicial loop-
hole in the criminal justice system through which judges may, at
their discretion, nullify jury sentencing verdicts with which they
disagree. Perhaps such a scheme would not be so constitutionally
egregious if it involved a less significant matter. However, jury
overrides as used in capital sentencing can result in a serious and
irrevocable deprivation-the deprivation of life. Such a severe
penalty, according to Justice John Paul Stevens, demands "unique
safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given of-
fense."'1 2 It is precisely due to the need for such safeguards that
jury override schemes fail to comport with the Constitution.
This Comment argues that life-to-death jury overrides are
procedurally and substantively unconstitutional and advocates the
repeal of capital statutes that permit them. Part II of this Com-
ment surveys the historical framework of modem jury override
schemes and discusses the current law regarding their constitu-
tionality. Part III criticizes the existing law as arbitrary, variable,
and ultimately unconstitutional. It analyzes how such discretion-
ary sentencing procedures violate a criminal defendant's Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process of law, Fifth Amendment
right against double jeopardy, and Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial. Part IV recommends the repeal of statutory jury over-
ride provisions but also proposes, in the alternative, narrower
override schemes that limit judicial discretion and bolster jury
verdicts. Finally, Part V assesses the present and future implica-
tions of such an untenable feature of our criminal justice system.
10. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury' Override in Alabama
Death Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. L. REV. 5, 5 (1994). For purposes of this Comment,
the term "jury override" refers specifically and solely to overrides of life imprison-
ment sentences. This Comment does not argue that overrides of death sentences are
unconstitutional.
12. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY JURY OVERRIDE SCHEMES
A. Laying the Groundwork
Jury override jurisprudence in capital cases began in the 1970s
with the landmark United States Supreme Court decision in Fur-
man v. Georgia.13 In Furman the defendant was convicted of rape
and murder and sentenced to death on both counts.14 The Court
held in a plurality opinion that death penalty laws as they existed
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. 15 One rationale for the Court's ruling was that the
discretion given to judges and juries for imposing death sentences
was too broad.16 The Court also expressed concern about the se-
lective application of the death penalty.'7 Justice William Doug-
las, for example, intimated that the system singled out minorities
and the poor.18 The scathing criticisms of existing death penalty
laws in the Furman decision prompted the overhaul of capital stat-
utes across the country.' 9 Within a few years more than two-thirds
of the states enacted new death penalty legislation.
20
With new death penalty laws, however, came the new problem
of varying capital sentencing schemes.21 The Supreme Court at-
tempted to remedy this dilemma by specifying in a series of 1976
decisions which type of sentencing schemes would be constitu-
tional under Furman.22 The most notable was Gregg v. Georgia
23
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
14. See id. at 239.
15. See id. at 23940.
16. The Furman Court feared that capital statutes lacked adequate checks and
balances, thus giving judges and juries unbridled discretion in deciding the fate of
individuals.
[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants com-
mitting these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no
standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die,
dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.
Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (indicating that the petitioners were
"among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed").
18. See id. at 249-53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
19. See Russell, supra note 11, at 8.
20. See id. For a discussion of post-Furman legislation, see Patrick E. Higgin-
botham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1047 (1991); The Su-
preme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARv. L. REV. 87, 97-108 (1984).
21. See Russell, supra note 11, at 9.
22. See id. at 8 (citing Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v.
January 19971
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in which the defendant was. convicted and sentenced to death for
armed robbery and murder.2 4 The Court rejected the defendant's
constitutional challenge and identified three constitutional safe-
guards for avoiding arbitrary death penalty verdicts. First was bi-
furcation-dividing death penalty cases into two successive phases
of conviction and sentencing.25 Second was the weighing of both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances where at least one ag-
gravating circumstance must be found to justify a death sentence.
26
And third was direct review of death penalty verdicts by the state's
highest court.27
From the Supreme Court's mandate for death penalty reform
emerged three distinct types of capital sentencing statutes: those
that vest juries with exclusive sentencing authority, those that give
such authority to judges, and those that divide sentencing discre-
tion between juries and judges but allow for judges to override jury
verdicts in light of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
28 Of
the thirty-nine states that allow capital punishment, thirty give ju-
ries the ultimate sentencing authority unless the defendant has re-
quested sentencing by the court.2 9 Four states-Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska-vest such authority in judges.30 Combin-
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. See id. at 158, 161.
25. See id. at 195.
26. See id. at 196-97.
27. See id. at 198, 204.
28. See Russell, supra note 11, at 9-10.
29. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
46a (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Harrison 1994); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (1995); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 70
(West Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.006
(West 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAv § 400.27
(McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West
1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
23A-27A-4 (Michie 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 1996); TEx. CODE
CRiM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp.
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.95.050 (West 1990); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie Supp. 1996).
30. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 19-
2515 (Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-103 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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ing the two schemes, Nevada gives, juries primary sentencing
power but allows for a three-judge -panel to make the final decision
if the jury cannot reach agreement.31 Four states, however, have
opted for the anomalous scheme of giving juries only an advisory
role and allowing judges to accept or reject jury recommendations
at their discretion. They are Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and
Indiana.32
1. Alabama's jury override scheme
Alabama's death penalty statute33 prompted the most recent
United States Supreme Court decision upholding jury overrides in
capital cases.34 Adopted in 1981, the statute prescribes a trifur-
cated trial and sentencing procedure.35 In the first phase the court
impanels twelve jurors to decide on the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence.36 A guilty verdict must be unanimous. 37
If the jury reaches such a verdict, the advisory phase follows. 38
This second phase involves a jury determination as to whether the
defendant should receive a sentence of death or life imprisonment
without parole.39 The sentencing hearing may be conducted be-
fore a new jury if the trial jury is unavailable.4 0 In arriving at a
sentence, the jury considers whether statutory aggravating4' and
29-2522 (Michie 1995).
31. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.556 (Michie 1992).
32. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. it. 11, § 4209(d)
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-(3) (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(e) (Michie Supp. 1996).
33. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39 to -59.
34. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995). For a complete discussion of
the Harris decision, see infra Part II.B.
35. See Russell, supra note 11, at 24.
36. See generally ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.1(a) (Michie 1996) (giving a criminal de-
fendant the right to a jury trial).
37. See id. at 23.1(a).
38. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 to -46.
39. See id § 13A-5-45(a).
40. See id.
41. The statute identifies the following as aggravating circumstances:
(1) The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of im-
prisonment;
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person;
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons;
(4) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or
was an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing, or attempting to commit, rape, robbery, burglary or kid-
napping;
(5) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
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mitigating42 circumstances or any nonstatutory mitigating circum-
stances exist.43 To render a death verdict, a minimum of ten jurors
must find at least one aggravating circumstance that outweighs any
mitigating circumstances.44 Thus the vote need not be unani-
mous.45 To recommend life imprisonment without parole, only a
majority-at least seven out of twelve-of the jurors need to
agree. 46 If less than ten jurors vote for death and less than seven
vote for life, the trial judge may declare a mistrial and initiate a
new sentencing hearing with new jurors.47 Like Florida's statute,
Alabama's override statute does not give juries any guidance for
finding or weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.
48
After the jury offers its recommendation, the trial judge inde-
pendently makes written findings as to the existence of aggravating
and mitigating evidence. 49 The judge then determines whether the
venting a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
(6) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain;
(7) The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws; or
(8) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared
to other capital offenses.
Id. § 13A-5-49.
42. The statute defines mitigating circumstances as including, but not limited to,
the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to
it;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital offense committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired; and
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id § 13A-5-51.
43. See id. § 13A-5-45(c).
44. See id § 13A-5-46(e)-(f).
45. Compare with Florida's capital statute requiring only a majority jury vote to
issue a death sentence. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
46. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f).
47. See id. § 13A-5-46(f)-(g).
48. Unlike the Delaware and Indiana capital statutes, which require that the jury
find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance exists before rec-
ommending the death penalty, the Alabama and Florida statutes are silent on this
matter. See DEL. CODE AN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(k)(1).
49. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d).
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aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones and imposes a
sentence after considering the jury's advisory verdict.50 Thus the
trial judge is not bound by the jury recommendation or held to any
burden of proof in arriving at a sentence.51 In effect, the decision
may be entirely subjective.52 The statute, however, does'require a
judicial finding of at least one aggravating circumstance for the
death penalty to be imposed.53
If the judge rejects the jury's recommendation of life impris-
onment and imposes a death sentence, the decision is automati-
cally reviewed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which
is in turn subject to review by the Alabama Supreme Court.54
Both courts will consider whether any errors existed in the sen-
tencing proceeding and, if so, whether they violated the defen-
dant's rights.55 The courts will also determine if the trial judge's
findings of aggravating and mitigating factors have evidentiary
support.56 In their review, the courts will look for any prejudice
that may have influenced the death sentence as well as consider
whether the sentence is disproportionate to the crime.57 Despite
this process, Alabama remains the only jury override jurisdiction
without an articulated standard for reviewing death sentences im-
posed over jury recommendations for life imprisonment. 58 The
United States Supreme Court, nevertheless, has held Alabama's
jury override statute constitutional. 59
50. See id. § 13A-5-47(e).
51. See id.; Russell, supra note 11, at 26-27 (noting that "[i]n Alabama, the stan-
dard a trial court should use to determine whether the override is appropriate re-
mains unclear").
52. See, e.g., Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1037 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
observed that "unlike any other State in the Union, the trial judge [in an Alabama
court] has unbridled discretion to sentence the defendant to death--even though a
jury has determined that death is an inappropriate penalty." Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
53. See Russell, supra note 11, at 26 (citing Murray v. State, 455 So. 2d 53, 67
(Ala. Crim. App. 1983)).
54. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(a).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. § 13A-5-53(b)(1), (3).
58. See Russell, supra note 11, at 27.
59. See Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036 (holding that Alabama's jury override statute
did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to specify the weight a trial judge
must give to a jury's recommendation).
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2. Delaware's jury override scheme
Delaware is the most recent state to adopt a jury override
statute.60 Codified in November 199161 and upheld by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court a few months later,62 the statute similarly
calls for an advisory phase and appellate review for imposing the
death penalty after a guilty verdict. 63 Under Delaware law, a trial
court may only impose a death sentence "after considering the
recommendation of the jury."64 Thus the trial judge retains the
ultimate responsibility of imposing a life or death sentence while
the jury merely acts in an advisory capacity.65
The statute requires that the sentencing hearing be conducted
before the same trial jury if possible.66 Otherwise, a new jury may
be selected for the hearing.67 The jury must initially decide
whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt68 that at
least one statutory aggravating factor exists.69 It must then find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating factors out-
weigh the mitigating ones. 70 This process entails weighing all rele-
vant aggravating and mitigating aspects of the crime as well as
considering the character and criminal predisposition of the of-
fender.71
The trial judge then considers the jury's sentencing verdict
60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209.
61. The governor of Delaware signed the new law on November 4, 1991. See
State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846,849 (Del. 1992).
62. See id. at 848.
63. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209.
64. IL § 4209(d).
65. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329,335 (Del. 1993).
66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b)(1).
67. See id. (providing for the selection of new jurors and alternates if the trial
jury cannot participate in the sentencing hearing).
68. This is the same standard used by Indiana. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(a).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(1). Of the four override statutes,
Delaware's statute contains the highest number of aggravating circumstances-22 in
all. The following is a partial list: the defendant committed murder while escaping
from custody or confinement or to avoid or prevent arrest; the defendant paid or was
paid by someone else for the murder of the victim; the defendant had a previous
murder or manslaughter conviction involving the use of force or violence; the defen-
dant committed murder while attempting to commit unlawful sexual intercourse, ar-
son, kidnapping, robbery, sodomy, or burglary; the victim was pregnant, severely
handicapped or disabled, 62 or older, or defenseless. See id. § 4209(e)(1).
70. See id § 4209(c)(3)(a)(2). Unlike the other jury override statutes, Dela-
ware's statute does not enumerate any statutory mitigating circumstances.
71. See id
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and subsequently makes the same two-step inquiry.72 If the judge
answers both questions in the affirmative, the judge must impose a
death sentence.73 Otherwise, the defendant must be sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole.
74
If a death sentence is imposed, it must be justified in writing75 and
automatically qualifies for review by the Delaware Supreme
Court.7 6 The supreme court must determine whether the trial
judge arbitrarily imposed the death penalty, taking into account
the totality of the aggravating and mitigating evidence. 77 The
court must also consider whether the evidence supports the trial
judge's finding of a statutory aggravating factor.78 If the court
finds any errors in the sentencing hearing, it may set aside the
death sentence and remand for correction.79 Such errors, however,
will not prevent the death sentence from being reimposed over the
jury's recommendation if the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately
finds it appropriate.80
Like the other jury override states, Delaware has not codified
a standard for reviewing death sentences imposed over jury rec-
ommendations of life imprisonment.81 It seems, though, to be
following Florida's and Indiana's lead by adopting the "clear and
convincing" standard of review82 prescribed by Florida's supreme
court in Tedder v. State83 and endorsed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Proffitt v. Florida.84 The Supreme Court has yet to
decide on the constitutionality of Delaware's statutory override
72. See id. § 4209(d)(1)(a)-(b).
73. See id. § 4209(d)(1).
74. See id. § 4209(d)(2).
75. See id. § 4209(d)(3).
76. See id. § 4209(g).
77. See id. § 4209(g)(2)(a).
78. See id. § 4209(g)(2)(b).
79. See id. § 4209(g)(4)(b).
80. See id.
81. As noted above, the statute merely instructs the Delaware Supreme Court to
consider "the totality of evidence in aggravation and mitigation" in deciding the ap-
propriateness of a death sentence. Id § 4209(g)(2)(a).
82. See Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1992). In Pennell, which in-
volved a double murder, the court held that the facts supporting the death sentences
imposed on the defendant for the murders were "so clear and convincing that virtu-
ally no reasonable person could differ." Id.
83. 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). For a complete discussion of the Tedder
standard, see infra Part II.B.
84. 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976). For a complete discussion of the Proffitt decision,
see infra Part II.B.
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provision.8 5 So far, however, no death sentences have been im-
posed over a jury recommendation of life imprisonment under
Delaware's new capital statute.8 6
3. Florida's jury override scheme
In response to the Furman decision, Florida's legislature re-
vised its death penalty statute in 197287 and became the first state
to enact a jury override scheme.88 Four years later the United
States Supreme Court held it constitutional.8 9 Under the new
Florida law, a defendant found guilty of first degree murder must
undergo a separate sentencing hearing.90 Like Alabama and
Delaware, Florida does not require that the same trial jury partici-
pate in this hearing.91 The court may impanel a "special" jury to
determine the sentence if necessary. 92 During this penalty phase
the jury hears evidence to determine the existence of any of the
twelve aggravating93 or seven mitigating94 circumstances listed in
85. See Russell, supra note 11, at 17.
86. See Abe Muallem, Harris v. Alabama: Is The Death Penalty in America En-
tering a Fourth Phase?, 22 J. LEGIS. 85, 87 (1996).
87. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141.
88. See Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death
Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1409, 1410 (1985) (noting that Florida
passed its new capital statute just six months after the Furman decision).
89. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259.
90. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1).
91. See id. (instructing the trial judge to impanel a new jury to determine the sen-
tence if the trial jury cannot reconvene for the sentencing phase due to "impossibility
or inability"). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) with ALA. CODE § 13A-5-
46(b) (allowing for a new sentencing jury if it is "impossible or impracticable" for the
trial jury to decide sentencing) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (allowing for
the replacement of the trial jury with a "separate and new jury" during the sentenc-
ing phase).
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1).
93. Florida's statutory list of 12 aggravating circumstance is nearly identical to
Alabama's. Circumstances are considered aggravating where the defendant commit-
ted a murder while serving a prison sentence; where the defendant had a previous
capital felony conviction; where the defendant committed a murder while commit-
ting robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or an un-
lawful detonation of an explosive device; where the murder was particularly cruel or
atrocious; or where the defendant committed a homicide in a cold and calculated
manner without any moral or legal justification. See id. § 921.141(5).
94. The seven mitigating circumstances set forth by the Florida legislature also
resemble those codified by Alabama's override statute and include the following:
the defendant has no prior criminal activity; the defendant committed a murder un-
der the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; the victim consented
to the defendant's act; the defendant was an accomplice to the murder with a minor
role; the defendant acted under duress; the defendant lacked the capacity to appreci-
[Vol. 30:863
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the statute.95 It then considers whether the mitigating circum-
stances outweigh the aggravating ones in deciding on a recom-
mendation for life or death.96
Like Alabama, Florida does not require a unanimous verdict
by the jury in the sentencing phase.97 Florida's statute is similarly
silent as to the standard of proof for weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors.98 Furthermore, it fails to provide for any in-
quiry as to the exact breakdown of the votes or the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances that shaped them.99 Rather, the
judge simply asks each juror whether the majority voted for life or
death.'0 0 A tie vote equates to a recommendation for life impris-
onment.' 0 ' The judge then imposes the final life or death sen-
tence, unconstrained by the jury verdict. 102 However, any jury
override resulting in a death sentence must "be supported by spe-
cific written findings of fact" outlining the mitigating and aggravat-
ing circumstances used to make the decision. 103
The conclusion of the penalty phase automatically triggers the
appellate process.10 4 Any imposition of death shall be given prior-
ity review by the Florida Supreme Court.105 However, Florida
does not provide its supreme court with any statutory guidelines
for review and simply leaves it to the court to fashion its own
rules.106 As a result, in 1975 the court adopted the following test
for reviewing jury override cases resulting in a death sentence:
whether the facts justifying the imposition of death are "so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."'1 7
For over twenty years, this standard has governed Florida Su-
preme Court review of death sentences resulting from jury over-
ate the unlawfulness of the conduct. See id. § 921.141(6).
95. See id. § 921.141(2).
96. See id. § 921.141(2)(b), (c).
97. See id. § 921.141(3) (allowing the trial judge to impose death
"[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury") (emphasis
added).
98. See Brewer v. State, 417 N.E.2d 889, 898 (Ind. 1981).
99. See Radelet, supra note 88, at 1411.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
104. See id § 921.141(4).
105. See id.
106. See id (allowing for review of jury overrides to "be heard in accordance with
rules promulgated by the [Florida] Supreme Court").
107. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.
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rides.108
In the decade following the enactment of its jury override
death penalty statute, Florida led the country in both the number
of prisoners sentenced to death and executed.109 As of 1994 its
death row count ranked third behind Texas and California.110
Florida is also the only state that frequently invokes its jury over-
ride scheme to impose death.111 In fact, only two decades or so af-
ter the Florida legislature added the override provision to the
state's capital statute, twenty percent of those sentenced to die had
originally received jury recommendations of life.112 By 1992 Flor-
ida trial judges had rejected jury recommendations of life impris-
onment and sentenced the defendants to death in 134 cases.1
13
Three of them were executed between 1984 and 1991.114
4. Indiana's jury override scheme
Indiana incorporated an override provision 1 5 into its capital
statute in 1977,116 and its supreme court upheld the new law four
years later.117 Like the other jury override schemes, Indiana's
capital statute provides for trifurcated proceedings consisting of a
trial, sentencing hearing, and appellate review.118 But unlike the
other three states, Indiana requires that the sentencing phase be
conducted before the same jury that tried the case.119 The jury
may recommend either the death penalty or life imprisonment
without parole120 if it finds that the government has proven beyond
a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the statutory
108. See Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override
and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 923, 936 (1991) [hereinafter Mello,
Jurisdiction] (asserting that "Tedder has become the cornerstone of the Florida Su-
preme Court's override doctrine").
109. See Radelet, supra note 88, at 1409.
110. See Russell, supra note 11, at 11 n.46.
111. See Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice
of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 32 (1985).
112 See Mello, Jurisdiction, supra note 108, at 926.
113. See Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello, Death-To-Life Overrides: Saving
the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 195, 196 (1992).
114. See id. at 196 n.3 (noting executions in 1984,1987, and 1991).
115. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e).
116. See E. Nelson Chipman, Jr., Note, The Indiana Death Penalty: An Exercise in
Constitutional Futility, 15 VAL. U. L. REv. 409, 424 (1981).
117. See Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95, 108 (Ind. 1981).
118. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9.
119. See id. § 35-50-2-9(d).
120. See id. § 35-50-2-9(e)(1)-(2).
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aggravating circumstances 21 alleged.' 22 In addition, the aggravat-
ing factors must outweigh any mitigating circumstances
123
found.' 24
The trial judge, however, is not bound by the jury's recom-
mendation.125 The statute authorizes the judge to make the final
determination as to the sentence "after considering the jury's rec-
ommendation... based on the same standards that the jury was
required to consider."'126 If the judge decides to impose a death
sentence contrary to the jury's recommendation, the decision
automatically qualifies for review by Indiana's supreme court.127
Although the statute does not specify how soon the review must
occur, it gives such hearings priority over all other cases. 28 In re-
viewing the death sentence, the Indiana Supreme Court must con-
sider all claims that the sentence violates the state or federal con-
stitution 29 or, in the alternative, that the sentence is excessive or
erroneous. 130
Although the statute does not provide any guidance for re-
view, the Indiana Supreme Court in 1989 promulgated a test
modeled after the Tedder standard.131 The court held that "the
121. The 15 aggravating circumstances enumerated in the Indiana statute echo
those promulgated by the other jury override states. However, the statute includes a
few distinctive aggravating factors. For example, a murder is considered more seri-
ous if the defendant committed it in connection with drug dealing, while lying in
wait, or through a drive-by shooting; if the defendant dismembered the murder vic-
tim; or if the victim was less than 12 years old. See id. § 35-50-2-9(b).
122. See idL § 35-50-2-9(k)(1). This is the same standard used by Delaware for de-
termining the existence of aggravating circumstances. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(c)(3)(a)(1). However, Delaware additionally prescribes a preponderance of
the evidence standard for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id.
§ 4209(c)(3)(a)(2).
123. With regard to mitigating circumstances, Indiana's statute is the most facially
liberal among the four jury override statutes because it contains a catch-all provision.
The statute provides that in addition to the seven statutory mitigating circumstances
listed, "[a]ny other circumstances appropriate for consideration" may be taken into
account by the jury in making its sentencing decision. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(c)(8).
124. See id. § 35-50-2-9(k)(2).
125. See id. § 35-50-2-9(e).
126. Id. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) with DELCODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(d)(1) (requiring a trial judge to make the same inquiry as the jury when decid-
ing the defendant's guilt).
127. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-90).
128. See id
129. See id. § 35-50-2-9(j)(1)(A)-(B).
130. See id. § 35-50-2-9(j)(3)(A)-(B).
131. See Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731,734-35 (Ind. 1989).
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facts justifying a death sentence should be so clear and convincing
that virtually no reasonable person could disagree that death was
appropriate in light of the offender and his crime."'1 32 The United
States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of
Indiana's jury override statute, although it has had two opportuni-
ties to do so. 133
B. The Supreme Court's Justifications for Jury Override Schemes
The first Supreme Court case challenging jury overrides, al-
beit indirectly, was Proffitt v. Florida.134 The defendant was con-
victed of first degree murder for a fatal stabbing and sentenced to
death.135 He appealed, arguing that Florida's jury override capital
statute violated due process guarantees because it allowed for arbi-
trary sentencing.136 He specifically attacked the statute's lack of
guidelines for weighing aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. 137 The Court rejected these claims, holding that Florida
provides criminal defendants with adequate safeguards by pre-
scribing a thorough sentencing procedure that includes a test for
meaningful appellate review of death sentences.138
This test, promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court in Ted-
der v. State,139 allows a judge to impose the death penalty despite a
jury recommendation to the contrary only if the facts supporting a
death sentence are "so clear and convincing that virtually no rea-
sonable person could differ."' 4 0 In other words, the trial judge
should give "great weight" to the jury recommendation. 141 Only a
crime that was "'especially' heinous, atrocious or cruel" would
clearly and convincingly justify the death penalty.142 Based on the
132 Id. at 735. The court subsequently overturned the trial judge's override de-
cision, explaining that reasonable people could differ on whether imposing death was
appropriate since the defendant's co-conspirator masterminded the murder. See id.
133. See Russell, supra note 11, at 17 & n.100 (citing in part Schiro v. State, 533
N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 910 (1989); Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047
(Ind.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983)).
134. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
135. See id at 244-45.
136. See id. at 254.
137. See id
138. See id at 251-53.
139. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
140. Id. at 910.
141. See id.
142. Id. (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), which elaborated on the
kinds of crimes considered "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"). The Dixon
court stated:
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Tedder standard, the Proffitt Court concluded that Florida's jury
override scheme adequately guides and channels sentencing dis-
cretion by trial judges.143 The Court also expressed support for
broad judicial discretion by adding that judges are more experi-
enced and thus better qualified than juries in deciding whether
criminal defendants should live or die.144
For the next twenty years, the Tedder standard dominated
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of capital
punishment. 45 In Spaziano v. Florida,146 the first major challenge
to jury override since Proffitt,147 the Court rejected the defendant's
claim that such a scheme runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against double jeopardy, the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
due process of law.148 The defendant had received the death pen-
alty from the trial judge over a jury recommendation of life im-
prisonment for the torture and murder of two women found in a
dumpster.149
Addressing the defendant's argument that the Florida statute
violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court held that proving such
a violation required more than a showing that the statute was dif-
ferent from other capital statutes.150 The Court then disposed of
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly
evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel
means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or
even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be included
are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony
was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the
norm of capital felonies-the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is un-
necessarily torturous to the victim.
Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 9.
143. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258.
144. See id at 252.
145. See Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991) (reaffirming the Court's belief
that Tedder provides capital defendants with "'crucial protection"') (citation omit-
ted); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1984) (rejecting a claim that the Ted-
der standard allowed for "arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death pen-
alty"); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294-95 (1977) (recognizing the significant
safeguards the Tedder standard affords a capital defendant).
146. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
147. See Russell, supra note 11, at 12.
148. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-67.
149. See id. at 450-52.
150. See id. at 464. The six-member majority stated that "[t]he Eighth Amend-
ment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority
of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." Id.
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the defendant's Sixth Amendment argument by asserting that the
constitutional right to a jury trial does not necessarily require jury
sentencing.151 The Court also held that the defendant was never
subjected to double jeopardy since "there is no constitutional im-
perative that a jury have the responsibility of deciding whether the
death penalty should be imposed."' 52 Finally, the Court rejected
the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment claim by holding that the
Tedder test afforded a capital defendant adequate due process.153
Despite the Supreme Court's faith in the Tedder standard, the
test poses several problems. First, the phrase "so clear and con-
vincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ" 54 re-
quires a judicial finding that the sentencing jurors were unreason-
able in order to justify an override. 55 This task presents a paradox
because our legal system necessarily assumes that, as triers of fact,
jurors are reasonable people. 56 Second, dispensing with this as-
sumption, how should the trial judge determine whether or not ju-
rors are reasonable? 157 Third, the phrase "no reasonable person
could differ" has broad implications, conceivably allowing the
judge to meet the standard by simply disagreeing with the jury.158
Finally, the Tedder test does not provide the trial judge with spe-
cific instructions for determining the sentence in light of the jury
recommendation. 159 Despite these problems, however, the Tedder
standard became the constitutional benchmark of modem jury
override jurisprudence. 160 That is, until Harris v. Alabama.1 61
151. See id. The Court also added that "the demands of fairness and reliability in
capital cases do not require [jury sentencing]." Id.
152. ld. at 465.
153. See id. (asserting that "the Florida Supreme Court takes [the Tedder] stan-
dard seriously and has not hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's
role").
154. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.
155. See Radelet, supra note 88, at 1425.
156. See Amy D. Ronner, When Judges Impose the Death Penalty After the Jury
Recommends Life: Harris v. Alabama as the Excision of the Tympanic Membrane in
an Augmentedly Death-Biased Procedure, 23 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 217, 248 (1995).
In her article Professor Ronner noted the linguistic paradox of the "reasonable per-
son" standard promulgated by Tedder. "Because the 'reasonable person' is the juror
... literal compliance with the Tedder standard should elicit judicial adherence to the
advisory jury verdict." Id. (second emphasis added).
157. See Russell, supra note 11, at 17.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 16. Professor Russell observed that "[in the absence of legislative
or appellate court directives ... trial court judges are left to decide cases without
guidance from an established rule." Id. at 16-17.
160. The Tedder standard remains the constitutional basis for Florida's override
[Vol. 30:863
DEATH BY JUDICIAL OVERKILL
In Harris the Supreme Court held that the Tedder standard for
reviewing jury overrides is not a constitutional requirement. 62
The jury in that case convicted the defendant of first degree mur-
der for plotting the murder of her husband to collect on his death
benefits. 6 3 At the sentencing hearing the jurors heard testimony
that the defendant had a good background and strong character,
and that she was raising seven children while working three jobs
and actively participating in her church. 164 Based on this testi-
mony, the jury returned a seven-to-five verdict recommending life
imprisonment without parole.165 The trial judge, however, over-
rode the verdict and imposed death, holding that the one aggravat-
ing circumstance-murder for pecuniary gain-outweighed all the
mitigating circumstances. 166 The defendant appealed, claiming
that Alabama's capital statute was unconstitutional because it
failed to specify the weight that trial judges must give to advisory
jury verdicts.167
The Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, claiming
that requiring "great weight" be given to jury recommendations
would "place within constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks
that properly rest within the State's discretion to administer its
criminal justice system."'1 68 Although acknowledging the "'crucial
protection' provided by the Tedder standard,169 the Court refused
to recognize it as a constitutional mandate. 7 0 The appropriate
analysis, the Court pointed out, is whether Alabama's override
scheme "adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to
prevent arbitrary results.'' The Court held that the Alabama
statute did just that by requiring the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, even though it did not specify a standard
doctrine, and both Delaware and Indiana have used it as a model for formulating
their own standards of review for jury overrides. See supra text accompanying notes
82-84, 107-08,131-32.
161. 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
162. See id. at 1035.
163. See id. at 1033.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id
167. See id. at 1034.
168. Id at 1036.
169. Id. at 1035 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 295).
170. See id (asserting that the Court's "statements of approbation [of the Tedder
standard], however, do not mean that the Tedder standard is constitutionally re-
quired").
171. Id
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for this process. 172 Thus in one broad sweep, the Supreme Court
brushed aside the constitutional defects of Alabama's amorphous
capital sentencing scheme and bolstered its legitimacy.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIFE-TO-DEATH JURY
OVERRIDES
A. Eighth Amendment Violation
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the im-
position of "cruel and unusual punishments,"'173 which the Su-
preme Court has defined as those that are "excessive" or
"disproportionate" to the crime.174 Arguably, a sentence may be
excessive or disproportionate if it contradicts what the community
deems is appropriate retribution for a particular offense. Fur-
thermore, since juries represent the community' 75 and reflect its
views in their decisions,176 it follows that rejecting jury recommen-
dations against the death penalty amounts to ignoring what the
community considers proportionate punishment. Severing this
crucial "'link between contemporary community values and the
penal system"" 77 inevitably raises the potential for arbitrary deci-
sions based on the personal whims and prejudices of judges-a re-
sult that the Supreme Court has expressly condemned.178 In short,
a death sentence should be justified by public sentiment to avoid
running afoul of the Eighth Amendment's protection against ex-
172. See id. (declaring that the Constitution does not compel a specific method for
balancing aggravating and mitigating factors).
173. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
174. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-73 (1976)).
175. See id. at 486-87 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens:
Juries-comprised as they are of a fair cross section of the community-are
more representative institutions than is the judiciary; they reflect more ac-
curately the composition and experiences of the community as a whole, and
inevitably make decisions based on community values more reliably, than
can that segment of the community that is selected for service on the bench.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
176. See Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted
that "[a] jury verdict expresses a collective judgment that we may fairly presume to
reflect the considered view of the community." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510,519 n.15 (1968)).
178. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465 (noting that the result of a sentencing process
must not be arbitrary or discriminatory).
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cessive punishment.1 79
A death sentence may also be considered excessive if it is in-
accurate. Accordingly, jury override schemes create the potential
for such inaccuracy by dividing sentencing responsibility between
jurors and judges, as Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in
Caldwell v. Mississippi.1 80 Such bifurcated sentencing may lead to
the unconstitutional result of jurors rendering hasty sentences un-
der the misguided belief that their decisions are reversible and
thus insignificant 81 They may simply shirk their duties and rec-
ommend death with the misunderstanding that the appellate proc-
ess will take care of the matter.182 Thus, "the jury may impose a
more severe penalty (Le., death subject to judicial review) than it
otherwise would. '' i8 3
B. Fourteenth Amendment Violation
The Fourteenth Amendment states "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."''84 The deprivation of life, in particular, raises special con-
cern because it is the ultimate punishment that our society can im-
pose upon a citizen. As such, it deserves heightened due process
179. See Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1042-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
concluded that "[t]he most credible justification for the death penalty is its expres-
sion of the community's outrage. To permit the state to execute [the defendant] in
spite of the community's considered judgment that [the defendant] should not die is
to sever the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring." Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
180. 472 U.S. 320,328-29 (1985).
181. See id. Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, wrote:
[W]e conclude that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sen-
tence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defen-
dant's death rests elsewhere. This Court has repeatedly said that under the
Eighth Amendment "the qualitative difference of death from all other
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the
capital sentencing determination."
Id. (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
182. See Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconsti-
tutionality of Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge
and Jury, 30 B.C. L. Rav. 283, 330-31 (1989) [hereinafter Mello, Taking Caldwell].
Professor Mello observed that "[i]nstead of an irrevocable choice between life and
death," jury override schemes offer juries "an intermediate choice; impose death, but
with the understanding that the decision is not final. Rather than being forced to
make the hard decision, the jury has a fall-back option. The defendant is left with a
chance to show the reviewing court that it was all a mistake." Id.
183. Id. at331.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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scrutiny. 8 5 Applying this scrutiny to jury override schemes reveals
that they impair criminal due process in several respects.
First, judges may reject jury verdicts for improper reasons.
Jury override statutes, in effect, credit judges with the wisdom to
recognize and rectify what they deem to be erroneous jury deci-
sions. But such schemes fail to take into account the possibility
that judges may override jury recommendations against the death
penalty based on political motives. This is not inconceivable given
that judges in most death penalty states are subject to election or
retention.186 These states include Alabama, Florida, and Indi-
ana.187 Therefore, how these judges rule in capital cases can have
a significant impact on their career prospects. 188 Indeed, the po-
litical repercussions of unpopular decisions or opinions can be
devastating. For example, in 1986 the governor of California
waged a successful campaign to oust three California Supreme
Court justices who opposed the death penalty.189 And in 1992 the
attorney general and prosecutors in Mississippi instigated the re-
moval of a supreme court justice because of his votes against the
death penalty on the bench.190
The threat of such political reprisal may motivate a judge to
override a jury recommendation against the death penalty, espe-
cially in a high-profile case. Indeed, the risk of trial judges impos-
ing prejudicial sentences is very real because "the fact that more
persons identify with victims of crime than with capital defendants
inevitably encourages judges who must face election to reject a
recommendation of leniency." 191 Juries, in contrast, are not as
185. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens remarked that "the death penalty is
qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence must be accompanied
by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense." Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 759, 776 (1995).
187. See id. at 777 n.85, 779 n.87.
188. See id at 776.
189. See Stephen B. Bright, Keynote Address: Capital Punishment and the Crimi-
nal Justice System: Courts of Vengeance or Courts of Justice?, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 279,
283 (1995) (citing James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death
Penalty Under State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1330 n.145 (1989)).
190. See id. at 283-84 (citing David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judici-
ary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REV. 1, 15-20
(1992)).
191. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 475 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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vulnerable or sensitive to political pressures and hence can be bet-
ter trusted to render just verdicts.192
Second, judicial sentencing contrary to jury determinations
skews the criminal justice process by failing to conform to com-
munity values. As discussed above, jury decisions tend to reflect
the values of the communities in which the jurors live and thus
provide a more accurate assessment of what the public considers
appropriate punishment for a particular crime.193 For this reason,
juries should be responsible for "'express[ing] the conscience of
the community on the ultimate question of life or death.""1 94 A
capital sentencing scheme that deprives them of this responsibility
subsequently creates the risk of death sentences being imposed in
disregard of community values.
Jury override schemes also impair the justice process by pro-
ducing unreliable jury death sentences.1 95 As previously discussed,
jurors may feel less compelled to render accurate and hence reli-
able verdicts if they think their decisions will have no legal
force.196 Such attitudes clearly diminish their sense of responsibil-
ity and inevitably result in their increased willingness to render
death sentences-even those they believe erroneous-based on
the misconception that their harsh verdicts would be duly cor-
in part).
192. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Stevens, jury decisions are more reliable because they harbor
no political motives:
I am convinced that our jury system provides reliable insulation against the
passions of the polity. Voting for a political candidate who vows to be
"tough on crime" differs vastly from voting at the conclusion of an actual
trial to condemn a specific individual to death. Jurors' responsibilities ter-
minate when their case ends; they answer only to their own consciences;
they rarely have any concern about possible reprisals after their work is
done.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 487 n.33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 63-
65 (1980)). Professor Gillers pointed out that "twelve people are more likely than
one person to reflect public sentiment, because jurors are selected in a manner en-
hancing that likelihood, and because trial judges collectively do not represent-by
race, sex, or economic or social class-the communities from which they come."
Gillers, supra, at 63.
194. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,519 (1968)).
195. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,330 (1985).
196. See id. (noting that "[iln the capital sentencing context there are specific rea-
sons to fear substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences when
there are state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of re-
sponsibility to an appellate court").
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rected at the appellate level.'9 7 As Justice Marshall wrote in
Caldwell:
Even when a sentencing jury is unconvinced that death is
the appropriate punishment, it might nevertheless wish to
"send a message" of extreme disapproval for the defen-
dant's acts. This desire might make the jury very recep-
tive to the prosecutor's assurance that it can more freely
"err because the error may be corrected on appeal.' 198
Simply put, jury override schemes tell jurors that they do not have
to take a death sentence seriously-that they can risk rendering an
erroneous or unsubstantiated death verdict without any fear or
qualms because, ultimately, the appellate process will ensure that
the defendant gets the proper punishment. Such misguided reli-
ance on appellate review, as Justice Marshall correctly pointed
out, "will generate a bias toward returning a death sentence,"'199
thereby contaminating the entire criminal justice process with un-
reliable results.
In sum, due process is not due when those entrusted to carry it
out fail to appreciate the significance of their duty. The gravity of
a death sentence deserves serious deliberation-an essential ele-
ment of the capital sentencing process which jury override statutes
effectively vitiate.
C. Fifth Amendment Violation
The Fifth Amendment provides, "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. ' 200 Jury override schemes violate this constitutional prohi-
bition of double jeopardy by subjecting the defendant to two dif-
ferent sentences. Receiving a life sentence from the jury simply
clears the way for a death sentence from the judge. In addition,
whereas the defense gets only one opportunity to prove its case to
the jury, the prosecution is allowed to prove its case twice-first
before the jury and then again before the trial judge. 20' Giving
197. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
198. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 331 (quoting Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 54-55
(1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
199. Id. at 333.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
201. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1040 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens argued that jury override statutes, in effect, give prosecutors two
chances to obtain a death sentence:
A prosecutor who loses before the jury gets a second, fresh opportunity to
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prosecutors two chances to argue their case can produce lopsided
results in their favor. For instance, under Alabama's capital stat-
ute there have only been five instances where the judge rejected a
jury recommendation of death as compared to forty-seven rejec-
tions of jury recommendations for life imprisonment. 20
2
Ironically, the Supreme Court itself has conceded that subject-
ing a defendant to two capital sentencing hearings inherently poses
a double jeopardy problem due to the torturousness of such pro-
ceedings. 203 According to the Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a state from making repeated attempts to convince a sen-
tencer to impose the death penalty since the "'embarrassment, ex-
pense and ordeal' and the 'anxiety and insecurity' faced by a de-
fendant at the penalty phase of a... capital murder trial surely are
at least equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase
of a criminal trial. ' ' 204 With its vast resources, a state can easily
wear down a criminal defendant and ultimately obtain an unjust
death sentence if allowed to overprosecute. 205
D. Sixth Amendment Violation
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant "the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. ' 206 In
short, defendants have a right to be judged by their peers in their
community when they are charged with a crime. Although such a
right does not necessarily entitle a defendant to jury sentencing, it
seems more appropriate that jurors, as representatives of the
community's conscience, should have the last say on whether a
fellow citizen should live or die for committing a certain offense.
This issue, however, becomes irrelevant when a state specifi-
cally allows for jury sentencing as a procedural right, which is what
secure a death sentence. She may present the judge with exactly the same
evidence and arguments that the jury rejected. The defendant's life is twice
put in jeopardy, once before the jury and again in the repeat performance
before a different, and likely less sympathetic, decisionmaker. A scheme
that we assumed would "provid[e] capital defendants with more, rather
than less, judicial protection," has perversely devolved into a procedure
that requires the defendant to stave off a death sentence at each of two de
novo sentencing hearings.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
202. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981).
204. Id. at 445 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,136 (1980)).
205. See id.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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jury override schemes in effect do. By entitling defendants to two
jury verdicts through the process of law-one in the trial phase and
the other in the penalty phase-a state effectively imputes legal
validity to both. Both verdicts should thus be binding on the trial
court. It makes no sense, from either a logical or constitutional
standpoint, that a jury decision on the degree of punishment
should be accorded less weight than one concerning a defendant's
guilt or innocence. When a state grants a criminal defendant the
right to jury sentencing following a jury trial, it should recognize
the legitimacy of both.207
Jury sentencing verdicts should also be given the same legal
force as jury trial verdicts because the primary justification for the
latter equally applies to the former. The purpose of jury trials is to
prevent government oppression resulting from abuse of authority
by judges or prosecutors who may harbor political or personal
motives for securing convictions at the expense of criminal defen-
dants.208 The jury essentially serves as a buffer between the gov-
ernment and the accused, a role that dates back to colonial
207. See Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1065 (Ind. 1983) (DeBruler, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Judge DeBruler argued that a jury sentencing
hearing closely resembles a jury trial and should thus be given equal effect:
[Tihe jury reconvenes in court for the sentencing hearing. It is presided
over by the judge. The defendant is present with his counsel and the state
by its trial prosecutor. Evidence is presented in an adversarial setting. The
jury receives the instruction from the court regarding ... whether an aggra-
vating circumstance exists and whether it is... not ... outweighed by miti-
gating circumstances. The burden is upon the state to prove the aggravat-
ing circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The lawyers make final
arguments to the jury. The jury retires to deliberate and returns into open
court with its verdict in the form of a recommendation. This is a full scale
jury trial in every sense .... The jury recommendation against death is so
much like a binding decision, that constitutional protection against a second
hearing before the judge on the propriety of death should be afforded.
Id. (DeBruler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481-82 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Stevens observed:
"Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that
it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher
authority .... Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge .... [T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluc-
tance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to
one judge or to a group of judges."
L (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
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times.209 Inviting jurors to participate in the criminal justice proc-
ess as representatives of the community not only checks arbitrary
government power but also ensures legitimate verdicts that reflect
public sentiment.210 The need for such checks becomes apparent
when one considers empirical research indicating that judges and
juries generally render significantly different verdicts in capital
cases.21' This discrepancy, as Justice Stevens observed, supports
"the conclusion that entrusting the capital decision to a single
judge creates an unacceptable risk that the decision will not be
consistent with community values. 212 The right to be judged by
peers from one's own community is a deeply-rooted constitutional
hallmark of our criminal justice system. Therefore, statutory
schemes that deny individuals this fundamental right cannot be
allowed to stand.
IV. REPEALING OR LIMITING LIFE-TO-DEATH JURY OVERRIDE
SCHEMES
Due to the grave constitutional concerns posed by jury over-
ride statutes, it appears that the only feasible solution is to repeal
such schemes. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana should
follow the lead of their sister states and adopt sentencing proce-
dures that better protect the rights of criminal defendants. In
other words, to better ensure defendants a more efficient, reliable,
and just sentencing process, these states should adopt schemes that
assign sentencing responsibility exclusively to either the trial judge
or the jury213-preferably the latter214-rather than dividing it be-
209. See Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a
Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). Profes-
sor White wrote:
In assigning the jury this role, the framers of course drew from the English
as well as the colonial experience. The right to jury trial that the framers
viewed as an indispensable safeguard against government oppression...
had evolved in England over the course of several centuries. Thus, the his-
toric concerns that led to the adoption of the sixth amendment right to jury
trial are rooted to some extent in the historical evolution of the English
jury.
Id
210. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 482,490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
211. See id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
HANS ZEISEL, CENTER FOR STUDIES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SOME DATA ON JUROR
ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 37-50 (1968)).
212 Id. at 488-89.
213. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Parts III.A-B, D.
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tween the two.
However, since the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted
and affirmed the constitutionality of jury override provisions over
the last decade,215 repeal does not seem to be a viable or accept-
able alternative. Therefore, the necessary constitutional step to
take is to narrow jury override capital statutes by limiting judicial
discretion and bolstering jury sentencing verdicts.
One approach is to modify the Tedder standard by requiring
that trial judges have a "reasonable basis" for rejecting a jury rec-
ommendation of life imprisonment.216 This test may be less cum-
bersome to apply than one calling for an examination of whether
the facts so clearly and convincingly justify a death sentence that
"no reasonable person could differ. ' 217 Also, by focusing the in-
quiry on the reasonableness of the trial judge's action, an override
decision would be subject to more objective appellate scrutiny.
218
However, the problem with this approach is that it allows trial
judges to present only a minimal level of proof for overriding jury
recommendations.
A more effective remedy is to apply the reasonable basis test
to the jury instead of the trial judge. Under this scheme, the in-
quiry would be whether the jury has legitimate reasons for recom-
mending life imprisonment-with the term "legitimate" given
broad interpretation. Thus, for instance, a jury may be deemed to
have a legitimate reason for not imposing a death sentence if it
finds the existence of any mitigating factor. Holding juries to such
a low threshold of proof ensures that their decisions will be ac-
corded due weight and provides the added benefit of safeguarding
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
A third and more stringent alternative is to eliminate the Ted-
der standard altogether and accord jury sentencing verdicts a re-
buttable presumption of validity.219 Under this approach, jury sen-
tencing verdicts would be presumed correct and subject to reversal
only upon the finding of unfair prejudice against the prosecution.
The emphasis here is- on the word "unfair." It would not be
enough that the jury prejudicially sympathized with the defendant
215. See supra Part II.B.
216. See Joseph A. Colquitt, The Death Penalty Laws of Alabama, 33 ALA. L.
REv. 213, 328 (1982).
217. Id. at 328 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975)).
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 11, at 41. Professor Russell proposed a similar
solution in the form of a hybrid "two part 'Tedder plus.' test. Id.
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or morally refused to impose a death sentence. The prejudice
must have been to such a degree as to clearly invalidate the ver-
dict. This scenario could arise, for example, as a result of gross
jury misconduct.220 Only in light of such circumstances and others
of comparable severity could the presumption of validity be rebut-
ted.
A fourth option is to require the jury to put in writing its
findings and votes as to the existence of each statutory aggravating
and mitigating circumstance as well as any nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance.221 This scheme would give the trial judge a more
concrete and tangible basis for deciding whether to accept the
jury's advisory verdict.222 In short, written findings would elimi-
nate the need for a judge to speculate on why the jury decided for
life instead of death.223 Written findings would also have the
added effect of legitimizing jury sentencing recommendations. By
recording their findings, juries could show that their decisions were
not based on whim or prejudice but on substantive and meticulous
deliberations. Judges would then be more inclined to respect jury
decisions and not be too hasty to reverse.
A corollary solution is to also require trial judges to put in
writing their reasons for reversing jury recommendations against
220. By "misconduct" I mean any undue influence on jury deliberations such as
duress, bribery, blackmail, and the like perpetrated by extrinsic forces sympathetic to
or in collusion with the defendant. Proponents of jury override may argue that giv-
ing jury sentencing verdicts presumptive force would substantially reduce, if not vir-
tually eliminate, the prospects for jury overrides since instances of jury contamina-
tion are rare. However, such deference is consistent with our legal tradition of
according respect to jury decisions.
221. See Russell, supra note 11, at 41. Professor Russell noted that the Supreme
Court has rejected this proposition, holding that "the Sixth Amendment does not
require that the specific findings [of aggravating circumstances] authorizing the im-
position of the sentence of death be made by the jury." See Russell, supra note 11, at
41 n.246 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640 (1989)). This policy, however,
unsoundly overlooks the necessity of written records for determining how the jury
weighed and compared aggravating circumstances with mitigating ones to arrive at a
recommendation against death.
222. See Russell, supra note 11, at 41.
223. See id, at 41 n.247. Professor Russell offered the following justifications for
requiring juries to submit written findings to the trial judge:
Knowledge of the jury's findings as to aggravation and mitigation would
allow the judge to scrutinize the jury's decision. Based upon this informa-
tion, the judge could more fairly determine-in light of his or her experi-
ence as well as in light of information he or she has which was not made
available to the jury (i.e., the defendant's pre-sentence investigation re-
port)-whether the jury's recommendation should be followed.
Id. at 41.
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the death penalty. Although three of the four jury override capital
statutes already provide for this,224 they do not require juries to
make written findings, so there is no basis for comparing the sen-
tencing rationales of judges with those of juries.
Requiring judges to record their findings for comparison pur-
poses would yield two benefits. First, it would limit judicial dis-
cretion. Judges would no longer be able to simply reverse for
subjective reasons; rather, they would have to justify their rejec-
tion of an advisory jury verdict by identifying the flaws of the
jury's written findings and showing that their override decision was
necessary in the interest of justice. In other words, they must
prove that death is the most appropriate penalty in light of the to-
tality of the circumstances. Second, written records of both judi-
cial and jury findings ensure a more thorough appellate review
process.225 Currently in all four jury override jurisdictions, appel-
late judges are limited to reviewing only the trial judge's reasons
for reversing a jury sentencing verdict. 226 They have no record of
the jury's findings and hence no basis for comparison. Conse-
quently, the appellate review process is skewed in favor of trial
judges who can defend their decisions while the jury remains si-
lent.
A fifth alternative for limiting the effect of jury override stat-
utes is to provide trial judges with numerical weights for each ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstance. 227 Giving judges a clearer
idea of the specific value of each of the statutory circumstances
would enable them to determine if the jury had compared and bal-
anced such factors properly to arrive at an appropriate sentence.
This, too, limits judicial discretion because it prevents judges from
assigning their own subjective values to the various statutory ag-
224. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3)
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1996).
225. See Russell, supra note 11, at 41 (noting that "a judge's written findings, as
well as the jury's, would provide greater guidance to the appellate court in its review
of whether the trial court's override decision was fair and consistent in accord with
Furman").
226. Under all four jury override statutes, the state supreme court reviews the sen-
tencing authority's reasons for imposing a death sentence. So, in effect, only the trial
court's overriding death sentence is considered, not the jury's life recommendation.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(4); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-90) (Michie Supp. 1996).
227. See Russell, supra note 11, at 42. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines use a
similar sentencing procedure. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994-95
ed.).
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gravating and mitigating factors.
Finally, a more far-reaching solution is to give appellate
judges, rather than trial judges, the power to override advisory jury
sentences. Rather than allowing the trial judge to reverse a jury
and then submitting the reversal to a reviewing court, this entire
procedure could be eliminated by permitting prosecutors to appeal
directly to an appellate panel for jury reversals. The appellate
judges could then review the jury's findings with regard to the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether the
jury erred in not recommending death.
This scheme has two benefits. First, judicial power to reverse
jury verdicts would be vested in a multi-judge panel rather than
placed in the hands of a single judge. This would prevent any one
judge from injecting personal biases into the sentencing decision.
Requiring a common verdict from a slate of judges subsequently
ensures a more objective sentencing process. Second, appellate
override promotes judicial economy and sentencing efficiency.
Rather than clogging up trial court dockets by having trial judges
review advisory verdicts, this task would be relegated to the appel-
late courts where it rightfully belongs. This eliminates the poten-
tial for needless duplication of review. Instead of giving trial
courts a say and appellate courts the last say, it obviously makes
more sense to give the latter the only say.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of our legal tradition of according respect to jury de-
cisions, it is rather unsettling that our highest court could sanction
something as legally unsound as jury override schemes for impos-
ing the death penalty. And judging by recent Supreme Court de-
cisions, it does not seem likely that the Court will change its course
any time soon. Thus the constitutional dilemmas remain. Limiting
jury override schemes can only minimize these dilemmas rather
than offer a complete solution. What is at stake are the lives of
individuals that may be denied protection because the Supreme
Court has sanctioned anomalous capital statutes from four states
that flagrantly violate an accused's most fundamental rights: the
right against cruel and unusual punishment,228 the right to due
process of law,229 the right against double jeopardy,230 and the
228. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
229. See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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right to a jury trial.231 By permitting trial judges to override jury
recommendations against the death penalty, the Supreme Court
has, in effect, overridden the very constitutional'guarantees that
define and protect our democracy.
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230. See id. amend. V.
231. See id. amend. VI.
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